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Abstract
Markups vary widely across industries and countries, their heterogeneity has increased
overtime and asymmetric exposure to international trade seems partly responsible for this
phenomenon. In this paper, we study how the entire distribution of markups a¤ects re-
source misallocation and welfare in a general equilibrium framework encompassing a large
class of models with imperfect competition. We then identify conditions under which trade
opening, by changing the distribution of markups, may reduce welfare. Our approach is
novel both in its generality and in the emphasis on the second moment of the markup distri-
bution. Two broad policy recommendations stand out from the analysis. First, whenever
there is heterogeneity in markups, be it due to trade or other distortions, there is also an
intersectoral misallocation, so that the equilibrium can be improved upon with an appro-
priate intervention. This suggests that trade liberalization and domestic industrial policy
are complementary. Second, ensuring free entry is a crucial precondition to prevent adverse
e¤ects from asymmetric trade opening.
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What is relevant for the general analysis is not the sum of individual degrees of
monopoly but their deviations
A.P. Lerner
1 Introduction
Monopoly power varies widely across industries and rms. Data on 4-digit US manufacturing
industries show that Price-Cost Margins (PCMs), a common measure of markups, range from
1% in the rst percentile of the distribution, to 60% in the 99th percentile. Cross-country
evidence suggests these asymmetries to be even larger in less developed economies. More-
over, monopoly power varies systematically with exposure to international competition. For
instance, the average PCM is a slim 13% in US manufacturing, producing goods that are typi-
cally traded, versus a fat 33% in nontraded business sector services. The conventional wisdom
is that, as the process of globalization continues, competition among rms participating in in-
ternational markets will intensify, thereby alleviating the distortions associated with monopoly
power. The latter presumption is not however granted, because the exact mapping between
the economy-wide distribution of markups and the extent of misallocations is not an obvious
one.
The textbook partial-equilibrium analysis of the deadweight loss from monopoly seems to
imply that market power, by raising prices above marginal costs, is always distortionary. Yet,
this reasoning neglects the fact that, as pointed out by Lerner (1934) and Samuelson (1947),
in general equilibrium misallocations depend on relative rather than absolute prices. If all
prices incorporate the same markup, Lerner noted that relative prices would signal relative
costs correctly and, absent other sources of ine¢ ciencies, would lead to the optimal allocation.
This suggests that distortions only come from the dispersion of market power across rms
and industries. The implications of this principle are far-reaching. For instance, it implies the
paradoxical result that an increase in competition in industries with below-average markups,
such as those producing tradeable goods, is deemed to amplify monopoly distortions. It also
raises warnings that the increased heterogeneity in observed measures of market power across
industries may indicate growing misallocations. Yet, when market power is coupled with free
entry, so that markups a¤ect the equilibrium number of rms, new welfare e¤ects arise. For
instance, when rms produce di¤erentiated products and consumers like variety, it is desirable
that markups be high enough to induce the socially optimal level of entry.
The aim of this paper is to study how the economy-wide distribution of markups distorts
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the allocation of resources in a general framework that encompasses a large class of models of
imperfect competition. In doing so, we revisit and qualify the Lerner condition that markups
should be uniform across industries and illustrate when and how the level and dispersion of
markups matter. Our second goal is to relate the degree of monopoly power in an industry
to the presence of foreign competition and to study how trade can a¤ect welfare by chang-
ing the dispersion of market power. In particular, we are interested in nding under what
circumstances asymmetric trade liberalization may turn out to be welfare reducing.
To this end, we build a model with a continuum of industries that are heterogeneous in
both costs and demand conditions. Firms may produce homogenous or di¤erentiated goods
and entry may or may not be restricted. By comparing the market equilibrium with the
one chosen by a benevolent social planner, we identify the misallocations due to the entire
markup distribution. The results crucially depend on the assumptions about entry. If entry is
restricted, we conrm Lerners principle that markup symmetry across industries and rms is
a necessary and su¢ cient condition for e¢ ciency. Whenever this condition is violated, there is
an intersectoral misallocation whereby relatively less competitive industries underproduce and
relatively more competitive ones overproduce relative to the socially optimal quantity. Perhaps
surprisingly, we nd the extent of this misallocation to be stronger when the elasticity of
substitution between industries is high and we show that its welfare cost may be quantitatively
signicant. We also show that trade liberalization a¤ecting only some industries may have
adverse welfare e¤ects when it raises markup heterogeneity. In other words, contrary to the
conventional wisdom, procompetitive losses from trade are possible.
With free entry, the level of markups matters too and the Lerner condition about symmetry
turns out to be necessary, but not su¢ cient, for e¢ ciency. Moreover, contrary to the previous
case, we show that in general there exists no markup distribution capable of replicating the
rst best allocation. This means that policy interventions aimed at controlling prices only are
not enough to correct all the distortions and other instruments, such as subsidies, are needed.
Moreover, we nd that some heterogeneity in markups, despite the misallocation it induces,
may well be welfare improving. Finally, we show that free entry makes procompetitive losses
from trade unlikely, even when trade increases markup dispersion.
Two general policy recommendations stand out from our analysis. First, whenever there
is heterogeneity in markups, be it due to trade, regulations or di¤erential ability to collude
across sectors, there is an intersectoral misallocation. Industries with above-average markups
always underproduce (either in terms of output per rm or of product variety), so that the
equilibrium can be improved upon with an appropriate intervention. This also suggests that
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trade liberalization and domestic industrial policy are complementary. Second, free entry is an
important condition to prevent asymmetric trade liberalization from having possibly adverse
welfare e¤ects. A novel implication of our ndings is that the relative competitiveness of the
industries a¤ected by trade liberalization matters. This observation should be taken into ac-
count when designing trade policy. Interestingly, our analysis may also help rationalize the
often heard concern that trade may be detrimental in countries (especially the less developed
ones) where domestic markets are not competitive enough. The reason is not that domestic
rms are unable to survive foreign competition (as emphasized by the infant-industry the-
ory), but rather that international competition may ine¢ ciently increase asymmetries across
industries in the economy.
This paper makes contact with three strands of literature. The rst studies monopoly dis-
tortions in general equilibrium and includes classics such as Lerner (1934), Samuleson (1947),
Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), but also more recent works by Neary (2003), Koeniger and Licandro
(2006), Bilbiie, Ghironi and Melitz (2006) and others. Although all these papers made impor-
tant contributions, they all present a collection of special cases. Our approach is more general
in modelling preferences, imperfect competition (with and without free entry) and sectorial
asymmetries. We believe that such a unied framework is key to understanding how monopoly
distortions interact with more specic modelling assumptions.
Second, this paper is related to the literature studying the welfare e¤ects of trade in models
with imperfect competition, including the works of Brander and Krugman (1983), Helpman
and Krugman (1985) and more recently Eckel (2008). The observation that, in the presence of
distortions, trade might have adverse welfare e¤ects is an application of the second-best theory
and goes back to Bhagwati (1971) and Johnson (1965).1 Yet, what we nd more interesting
is the more specic insight, so far neglected, that trade can a¤ect welfare by changing the
cross-sectoral dispersion of market power.
Third, this paper relates to a recent literature on the macroeconomic e¤ects of misallo-
cations. Noteworthy contributions by Banerjee and Duo (2005), Restuccia and Rogerson
(2006), Hsieh and Klenow (2009), Song, Storesletten and Zilibotti (2008) and Jones (2009)
provide striking evidence that wedges distorting the allocation of resources between rms and
industries within a country are quantitatively very important in explaining low aggregate pro-
ductivity, particularly in less developed economies. Yet, they leave to future research the task
1Bhagwati (1971) and Johnson (1965) where the rst to argue that trade can lower welfare if it exacerbates
an existing distortion. Later studies have examined su¢ cient conditions for positive gains from trade in the
presence of various distortions. See, for example, Eaton and Panagariya (1979) and references therein.
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of identifying the origin of such wedges. Our paper contributes to this line of investigation
by studying how asymmetries in market power, that appear to be especially large in poor
countries, may be one source of misallocations.2
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 documents a number of little known stylized
facts that motivate our analysis. Section 3 builds a general theoretical framework that encom-
passes the most popular models of imperfect competition. Section 4 studies the welfare e¤ects
of markup dispersion and trade when entry is restricted. Section 5 extends the analysis to the
case of free entry. Section 6 concludes.
2 Motivating Evidence
In this section, we document a number of little known stylized facts that motivate our theoret-
ical investigations: (1) markups vary widely across sectors and their dispersion has increased
overtime; (2) asymmetric exposure to trade seems to be a likely explanation for the rise in
markup heterogeneity; (3) markup asymmetries are systematically related to the level of eco-
nomic development, with less asymmetries in wealthier countries.
Following a vast empirical literature (see, e.g., Roberts and Tybout, 1996; Tybout, 2003;
Aghion et al., 2005), we use price-cost margins (PCMs) as a proxy for market power.3 To
compute them, we draw production data from the OECD STAN database4, the CEPII Trade,
Production and Bilateral Protectiondatabase5 and the NBER Productivity database by Bar-
telsman and Gray. The latter is the most comprehensive and highest quality database on
industry-level inputs and outputs, covering roughly 450 US manufacturing (4-digit SIC) in-
dustries for the period 1958-1996. Price-cost margins are computed as the value of shipments
(adjusted for inventory change) less the cost of labor, capital, materials and energy, divided by
the value of shipments.6 Capital expenditures are computed as (rt + )Kit 1, where Kit 1 is
the capital stock, rt is the real interest rate and  is the depreciation rate.7 As a proxy for trade
2Gancia and Zilibotti (2009) shows how markup asymmetries may also distort the development of technology
in dynamic models with innovation.
3An important advantage of PCMs is that they can vary both across industries and overtime. An alternative
approach would be to estimate markups from a structural regression a là Hall (1988). One problem with this
approach is that, to estimate markups across industries or over time, either the time or industry dimension is
to be sacriced, implying that markups have to be assumed constant overtime or across industries.
4This database allows to compute PCMs for broad aggregates of traded and nontraded industries for a sample
of OECD countries.
5This dataset is based on information from the World Bank, the OECD and the UNIDO. It allows to compute
PCMs across broad manufacturing aggregates for a sample of developed and developing countries.
6Due to data availability, we do not net out capital expenditures and inventory change when using the OECD
and CEPII datasets.
7The US real interest rate, drawn from the World Bank-World Development Indicators, has a mean value of
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exposure at the industry level, we use the openness ratio, dened as the value imports plus
exports, taken from the NBER Trade database by Feenstra, divided by the value of shipments.
2.1 Markup heterogeneity across sectors and overtime
We start by showing asymmetries in markups across broad sectorial aggregates. Using economy-
wide data for the US in 2003 (from the OECD dataset), we nd that the average PCM equals
33% in the business sector services (mostly nontraded industries), 28% in agriculture (a heavily
protected industry) and 13% in manufacturing. As for services, the average PCM equals 24%
in the transport and storage industry, 28% in post and telecommunication, 38% in nance and
insurance, 48% in electricity, and reaches a peak of 66% in real estate activities. Interestingly,
in the renting of machinery and equipment industry, selling nontraded services, the average
PCM equals 41.5%, whereas in the machinery and equipment industry, producing traded man-
ufacturing goods, the average PCM is 9.5%. These huge asymmetries in price-cost margins
between traded and nontraded industries immediately suggest that markups may crucially
depend on the degree of tradeabililty of an industrys output, and hence that asymmetric ex-
posure to international competition may be an important determinant of markup heterogeneity
across industries.
Perhaps surprisingly, exposure to international competition varies dramatically also among
manufacturing industries. Figure 1 reports the time evolution of the openness ratio for selected
2-digit SIC industries within US manufacturing. Note that, at one extreme, the leather industry
has increased its trade share from 4% in the late 50s to 230% in the mid 90s. Other industries,
such as miscellaneous products or apparel, show a similar upward trend in the trade share. At
the other extreme, however, there are industries, such as printing, fabricated metal products
or food, whose openness ratio has increased by only a few percentage points over the past 40
years. More generally, when considering the entire distribution of the trade share across 4-digit
manufacturing industries, we nd that the openness ratio increased by only 6 percentage points
in the rst quintile of the distribution (from 1.2% in 1958 to 7.2% in 1994), and by more than
47 percentage points in the fourth quintile of the distribution (from 10.2% to 57.7%). These
gures suggest that, by a¤ecting some industries more than others, trade opening may have
increased asymmetries in market power.
3.75 percent (with a standard deviation of 2.5 percent) over the period of analysis. As for the depreciation rate,
the values for  used in the empirical studies generally vary from 5% for buildings to 10% for machinery. We
choose a value of 7%, implying that capital expenditures equal, on average, roughly 10% of the capital stock.
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INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE
Figures 2 and 3 provide suggestive evidence consistent with this conjecture. The former
reports the evolution of the standard deviation of PCMs across 450 US manufacturing indus-
tries (broken line) and the average trade openness of the same industries (solid line) over the
periods 1959-96 and 1958-94, respectively. It is immediate to see that, starting in the mid
70s, the dispersion of PCMs shows a relentless increase. Moreover, the standard deviation of
PCMs and the average openness chase each other closely. The simple correlation between the
two series equals 0.90 (0.40 after removing a linear trend). In Figure 3, we replace the rst
moment of the openness ratio with its second moment, again across 4-digit industries. Note
that the standard deviation of trade openness closely follows the standard deviation of PCMs;
the simple correlation between the two series is again very high, as it equals 0.88 (0.45 for
the detrended series). Thus, a rst look at the data suggests that markup heterogeneity has
increased overtime and that growing asymmetries in trade exposure may be partly responsible
for it.
INSERT FIGURES 2 AND 3 HERE
2.2 Trade and markup heterogeneity
We now look for more systematic evidence on the link between trade openness and the dis-
persion of market power. To this purpose, we exploit information contained in the cross-
sectional and temporal variation in the NBER datasets8 to construct the following time-
varying, industry-level proxies for the dispersion of markups and trade openness: for each
3-digit SIC industry, we compute the standard deviation of PCMs and the standard deviation
of the openness ratio among the 4-digit industries belonging to it. Next, we run Fixed-E¤ects
regressions of the former on the latter to test whether markup heterogeneity increases sys-
tematically in those 3-digit industries where trade exposure becomes more asymmetric. The
main results are reported in Table 1. In column 1, we run a univariate regression of the stan-
dard deviation of PCMs on the standard deviation of the openness ratio and nd that the
8We focus on US manufacturing because of the high level of disaggregation of industry data on sales and
costs provided by the NBER dataset. This should provide a lower bound for the e¤ects we aim to illustrate, as
international trade may raise the dispersion of markups also by increasing asymmetries between manufacturing
and service industries.
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two variables are strongly positively correlated, with a t-statistic around 8. In column 2, we
add a full set of time dummies to control for spurious correlation due to time e¤ects, e.g., the
deregulation of the US economy initiated by the Carter Administration in the mid 70s. The
coe¢ cient of the standard deviation of openness is somewhat reduced but is still very precisely
estimated, with a t-statistic of 5.
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE
The cross-industry dispersion of price-cost margins may also be a¤ected by technological
characteristics. Although Fixed-E¤ects estimates implicitly account for time-invariant techno-
logical heterogeneity, our results may still be driven by asymmetric technical change. Hence, to
control for variation in industry technology, in column 3 we add the standard deviation (again
within 3-digit SIC industries) of total factor productivity (TFP ), skill-intensity (H=L) and
capital-intensity (K=Y ).9 While these controls are generally signicant, they leave the sign
and signicance of our coe¢ cient of interest una¤ected. In column 4, we run a most severe
test by adding a full set of sector-specic linear trends. Notwithstanding the loss of identifying
variance, the results are unchanged.
In column 5, we add the average value of all RHS variables to check whether the correlation
between the second moments of PCMs and openness is driven by variation in the rst moment
of our covariates. It is not. Interestingly, the coe¢ cient of average openness is small and
insignicant, which suggests that the strong positive correlation between average openness
and the standard deviation of PCMs illustrated in Figure 2 was mediated by the induced
increase in the standard deviation of openness. In column 6, we therefore instrument the
standard deviation of the openness ratio with its mean value to see how the rise in the second
moment of openness attributable to a rise in its rst moment a¤ects the dispersion of markups.
Estimation is by Two-Stage Least Squares. In the rst stage regression for the standard
deviation of openness, not reported to save space, average openness is found to be a strong
instrument for its standard deviation, with a coe¢ cient of 1.65 and a t-statistic of 11.5. In
the second stage regression, the coe¢ cient of the standard deviation of openness is instead
the same as in the OLS regression, with a slightly larger standard error. These results are
consistent with the idea that globalization increases asymmetries in trade exposure, which in
turn increase markup heterogeneity across industries.
9Our measure of TFP is TFP5, from the Bartelsman and Grays database. Skill-intensity is proxied by the
ratio of non-production to production workers, and capital-intensity by plant and equipment per unit of output.
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Finally, in column 7 we also control for the average PCM. Although this variable is obvi-
ously endogenous, including it ensures that the second moment of the distribution of PCMs
is not mechanically driven by variation in the rst moment. The size and signicance of the
coe¢ cient of interest are una¤ected. Moreover, the coe¢ cient of the average PCM is nega-
tive and signicant, consistent with the idea that procompetitive forces may have induced a
simultaneous fall in average markups and an increase in their dispersion across industries.
2.3 Economic development and markup heterogeneity
Finally, we show how the dispersion of markups is correlated with the level of economic devel-
opment. To this purpose, we have computed the standard deviation of PCMs across three-digit
ISIC manufacturing industries for a sample of 49 countries in the year 2001 (from the CEPII
dataset). In Figure 4, we plot the log standard deviation of PCMs against the log of real
per capita GDP. Note that higher-income countries are characterized by a signicantly lower
dispersion of PCMs. This stylized fact is even stronger when considering asymmetries in the
PCMs between manufacturing and services. In Figure 5, we plot the log di¤erence between the
average PCM in services and manufacturing for a sample of 22 OECD countries in the year
2002. Note, again, that more developed countries are characterized by much lower asymmetries
in the PCMs. We thus conclude that misallocations due to asymmetries in market power seem
potentially relevant for understanding economic performance.
INSERT FIGURES 4 AND 5 HERE
3 A General Model of Imperfect Competition
A preliminary step for a comprehensive analysis of the distortions caused by an entire markup
distribution is to build a tractable multi-sector model of imperfect competition that is general
enough. This is the goal of the present section. We start by presenting a convenient representa-
tion of preferences, technology and market structure that encompasses as special cases a large
class of models used in the literature. Next, we will use this model as a workhorse to study
three issues: (1) the misallocation arising in a market equilibrium, (2) when and how regu-
lations a¤ecting markups can replicate the rst best equilibrium and, nally, (3) the welfare
e¤ects of asymmetric exposure to international trade. In modeling trade, we will focus on a
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symmetric-country case that will allow us to discuss the procompetitive e¤ect of liberalization.
In the interest of clarity, however, we begin our investigation with the closed economy.
3.1 Preferences and Technology
We focus on economies that admit a representative agent whose utility function can be used for
normative purposes. We assume that there is a unit measure of agents (implying that averages
coincide with aggregates), each supplying one unit of labor inelastically.10 Preferences are given
by the following CES utility function:
W =
Z 1
0
Ci
di
1=
;  2 ( 1; 1] ; (1)
where Ci is the sub-utility derived from consumption of possibly di¤erentiated varieties pro-
duced in industry i 2 [0; 1], and  governs the elasticity of substitution between industries,
 = 1= (1  ). Maximization of (1) subject to a budget constraint yields relative demand:
Pi
Pj
=

Cj
Ci
1 
; (2)
where Pi and Pj denote the cost of one unit of consumption baskets Ci and Cj , respectively.
To preserve tractability, we assume that varieties within a given industry are symmetric,
so that in equilibrium each will be consumed in the same amount. This assumption is in
line with our focus on between-industry rather than within-industry heterogeneity and is not
essential.11 It is particularly useful in that it allows us to use a simple and general reduced-form
representation for the sub-utility derived from consumption in a given industry. Specically,
Ci is given by:
Ci = (Ni)
i+1 ci; (3)
where ci is consumption of the typical variety in industry i and Ni is the number of available
varieties, equal to the number of rms in industry i. The parameter i in (3) captures the
preference for variety and is allowed to vary across industries. From (3), a greater variety Ni is
associated with higher utility whenever i > 0. To see this, denote the total quantity consumed
10We take labor supply as inelastic for simplicity. The e¤ects of competition and trade when labor supply is
elastic are extensively discussed in Bilbie, Ghironi and Melitz (2006) and Corsetti, Martin and Pesenti (2007).
In these models, imperfect competition also distorts the trade-o¤ between work and leisure.
11Extending our results to models featuring rm heterogeneity, such as Melitz (2003) and Melitz and Ottaviano
(2008), would be an interesting exercise that we leave for future work. Unfortunately, combining between and
within sector heterogeneity complicates substantially the analysis, making it convenient to study them separately.
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q = ciNi. Then, the sub-utility derived from consumption in industry i can be rewritten as
(Ni)
i q, which, holding constant total consumption q, is increasing in Ni if and only if i > 0.
Given the price of a single variety pi, the industry price index Pi, equal to the minimum
cost of one unit of Ci, can be found setting expenditure in industry i equal to the value of
demand, PiCi = Nipici. Substituting (3) yields:
Pi = N
 i
i pi: (4)
Each variety is produced by a single rm. Firms are owned by the totality of consumers so
that any positive prots or losses are rebated, but the exact form of redistribution is irrelevant
in our representative-agent economy. Production requires a xed cost fi and a marginal cost
1='i in units of labor. Firms charge a price equal to a markup over the marginal cost:
pi =
i ()w
'i
; (5)
where w is the wage rate and i ()  1 denotes the markup function. In general, the equilibrium
markup is a function of the price elasticity of demand perceived by each rm, i:
i =

1  1
i
 1
with i   @ ln yi
@ ln pi
;
where yi is production by a given rm. The perceived elasticity may in turn depend on the
number of rms in an industry and/or the elasticity of substitution in consumption across
goods. We impose the restriction i > , implying that goods are more substitutable within
industries than between industries.
The markup may also depend on regulations that a¤ect market contestability. For example,
there might be a competitive fringe of rms that can copy and produce any variety without
incurring the xed cost, but at a higher marginal cost. The higher marginal cost may capture
the lower expertise of outsiders, but can also depend on entry regulations that make production
more costly for external competitors. In this case, rms may be forced to charge a limit price
below (5) and equal to the marginal cost of the external competitors, in order to keep them
out of the market.
In what follows, we do not impose any restriction on the markup function so as to preserve
generality. Moreover, to ease notation, we will denote the markup simply as i, with the
understanding that it represents a function rather than a parameter. Rather than providing
a list of examples of markup functions, we just recall some of the most common reasons for
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markup heterogeneity. In models with di¤erentiated products (i > 0), these include: (1)
cross-industry di¤erences in the within-industry elasticity of substitution among varieties, as
in monopolistic competition a lá Dixit-Stiglitz with a continuum of rms; (2) cross-industry
di¤erences in the (low) integer number of rms and a common elasticity of substitution, as
in Dixit-Stiglitz with a discrete number of rms or in Atkeson and Burstein (2008). With
homogeneous products (i = 0), variable markups may instead result from: (3) Cournot or
Bertrand competition, as in Epifani and Gancia (2006) and Bernard et al. (2003). In cases (2)
and (3), more rms leads to higher competitive pressure and lower markups, i.e., @i=@Ni < 0.
In sum, our framework can encompass the most common models of imperfect competition,
describing environments where rms produce homogeneous or di¤erentiated goods and compete
in quantity or price.12
4 Restricted Entry
We consider now the case in which the number of rms per industry Ni is exogenously given,
so that entry and exit are not allowed. Although free entry might be a reasonable assumption
in many industries, entry restrictions are fairly common too, particularly in less developed
countries. For instance, the number of active rms may depend on the presence of government
regulations (such as licences). Restricted entry may also provide an adequate description of a
short-run equilibrium in which entry has not taken place yet and xed costs are sunk, making
exit never optimal. Be as it may, this case is useful to understand the e¤ects of trade and
monopoly power in a situation when rms make pure prots.
Note that when the number of rms is not a choice variable, the xed cost in production has
no bearings on the e¢ ciency property of the equilibrium. Therefore, without loss of generality,
we simplify the exposition by setting fi = 0. Recall also that prots are rebated to consumers.
4.1 Market Equilibrium
We start by characterizing the laissez-faire equilibrium. Denote Li as the number of workers
employed in industry i. By virtue of symmetry and the absence of xed costs (fi = 0),
production by a given rm is yi = 'iLi=Ni. Then, imposing market clearing (yi = ci) into (3)
12See the working paper version, Epifani and Gancia (2009), for specic examples. Other models of imperfect
competition that can be represented within our approach include monopolistic competition with translog demand
in Feenstra (2003), the generalization of Dixit-Stiglitz preferences by Benassy (1998), Melitz and Ottaviano
(2008), and models of price competition with di¤erentiated products that use the ideal varietyapproach, such
as Salop (1979), Lancaster (1979) and Epifani and Gancia (2006).
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we obtain:
Ci = 'iLi (Ni)
i : (6)
The allocation of labor across sectors can be found using (2), (4), (5) and (6):
Li
Lj
=

j
i
 1
1 

i
j
 
1 
; (7)
where i  'iNii is a measure of aggregate productivity at the industry level, taking
into account that consumption delivers a higher utility in industries where there are many
rms and a strong preference for variety. As expected, whenever goods are gross-substitutes
( > 0), more productive industries hire more workers. Further, for any nite value of , more
competitive industries (low i) also employ more workers. Integrating (7) and imposing labor
market clearing yields:
Li =
(i)
1
 1 (i)

1 R 1
0
 
j
 1
 1 (j)

1  dj
: (8)
Finally, substituting (8) into (6) and then into preferences (1), we obtain the utility of the
representative agent:
W =
Z 1
0
(Lii)
 di
 1

=
hR 1
0
 
 1i i
 
1  di
i 1

R 1
0
 
 1i 

i
 1
1  di
: (9)
This is our welfare measure. Inspection of (9) immediately reveals that utility is homogeneous
of degree zero in markups: multiplying all i by any positive constant leaves welfare una¤ected.
In other words, as originally argued by Lerner (1934), in this economy welfare is independent
of the average markup.13
13An important assumption behind this result is that labor supply is inelastic. The reason is that markups
lower wages below the marginal product of labor (MPL) and thus distort the work-leisure decision. For example,
in the case i = 1; 8i 2 [0; 1] we can show that:
w =
Z 1
0
 (i) =(1 ) di
(1 )=
< MPL = 1;
where the latter equality follows from the fact that, with i = 1, labor productivity is equal to one. The strength
of this distortion depends upon the elasticity of labor supply. However, as already noted by Lerner, even in this
setting a markup on leisure (or leisure goods) would restore his principle that only dispersion matters.
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4.2 Social Planner Solution
To illustrate the distortions that may arise in the market equilibrium, we now solve for the allo-
cation that maximizes the utility of the representative agent, subject to the resource constraint
of the economy. This is equivalent to solving the following planning problem:
max
Li
W =
Z 1
0
(Lii)
 di
 1

; (10)
subject to the resource constraint: Z 1
0
Lidi = 1:
Taking the ratio of any two rst order conditions yields the optimal labor allocation:
Li
Lj
=

i
j
 
1 
: (11)
Comparing (11) with (7) we see immediately that, for any nite , the decentralized equilibrium
is Pareto-e¢ cient if and only if i = j , 8i; j 2 [0; 1].
We summarize these results in the following proposition:
Proposition 1 When the number of rms is exogenous, welfare is homogeneous of degree zero
in markups. A necessary and su¢ cient condition to replicate the rst best allocation is that
markups be identical across all industries.
4.3 The Cost of Heterogeneity: Intersectoral Misallocations
If a uniform markup is su¢ cient to replicate the optimal allocation, what is then the cost of
asymmetric market power? From (8), it can be shown that the market equilibrium entails
underproduction in industries where the markup is above the following productivity-weighted
average:
 
24R 10  j 1 1 (j) 1  djR 1
0 (j)

1  dj
35 1 ;
and overproduction in industries where i < 
.14 Thus, the problem is one of an intersec-
toral misallocation whereby less competitive industries attract a sub-optimally low number of
14 Interestingly, this means that monopoly power is associated to overproduction in industries where 1 < i <
. Thus, the conventional wisdom that a monopolist always produces less than the socially optimal quantity
turns out to be wrong.
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workers. This happens because high markups compress the wage bill.
The welfare cost of the misallocation due to markup heterogeneity depends in an interesting
way on the curvature of the utility function (1). To see this, suppose that the i can be
approximated by a log-normal distribution and, to isolate the e¤ect of markup heterogeneity,
consider the case i = . Then, (9) can be rewritten as:15
lnW = ln  var (ln)
2 (1  ) ; (12)
showing that markup dispersion is more costly when goods are highly substitutable (high ).
The e¤ect of substitutability across goods on the monopoly distortion induced by asym-
metric markups is not an obvious one. On the one hand, a high substitutability means that
the cost of overproduction in some industries is small: indeed, this cost goes to zero as goods
become perfect substitutes. On the other hand, equation (7) shows that, for a given asym-
metry in markups i=j , a high substitutability magnies the misallocation of labor towards
the more competitive industries. It turns out that the latter e¤ect dominates, so that perhaps
counter-intuitively a atter curvature of the utility function leads to a higher cost of markup
dispersion. On the contrary, (11), (7) and (12) show that, as we approach the Leontief case
(!  1), the intersectoral misallocation disappears.
It is also interesting to observe that the distortion induced by markups di¤ers fundamentally
from distortions that manifest themselves as higher production costs. To see this, consider the
case of no markup dispersion. When i = , the welfare function becomes:
W =
Z 1
0
(i)

1  di
 1 

: (13)
Assuming i to be log-normal and using the properties of log-normal distributions (twice),
welfare becomes:
lnW = lnE () +

2  1
1  

var (ln)
2
: (14)
Intuitively, welfare is an increasing function of average productivity, lnE (). Perhaps more
surprisingly, (14) shows that, despite the symmetry in preferences, the variance of productivity
i becomes welfare increasing when  > 0:5, i.e., when the elasticity of substitution between
15To derive (12), recall that, if x  logNormal; then:
lnE (xn) = nE (lnx) + n
2var (lnx)
2
:
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goods is greater than two. This happens because, when  is su¢ ciently high, agents can easily
substitute consumption from unproductive industries to high i ones.16
In the general case, welfare is a complex function of the entire distributions of both i
and i. Although it is di¢ cult to make more precise statements regarding the impact of a
particular change in those distribution and their correlation, from (9) we can derive a simple
formula that can be used to measure welfare given data on i and i:
W =
E ()E
 


+ cov
 
;

E ()E
 


+ cov(;)
 ; (15)
where  = (i)
=(1 ) and  =  (i)1=( 1).
We summarize the main ndings of this section in the following proposition:
Proposition 2 Markup heterogeneity introduces an intersectoral misallocation, whereby in-
dustries with below-average markups overproduce, and industries with above-average markups
underproduce. The extent and the cost of this misallocation are proportional to the elasticity
of substitution between industries.
4.4 Procompetitive Losses From Trade
We now open the model to international trade to show that, when entry is restricted, trade
integration tightening competition in some industries may amplify monopoly distortions. More-
over, the e¤ect can be so strong that an equilibrium with trade may be Pareto-inferior to autarky
for all the countries. Although rather extreme, this example is illustrative of the neglected prin-
ciple that trade can a¤ect welfare by changing the cross-sectoral dispersion of market power. A
noteworthy corollary is that the characteristics of industries a¤ected by trade liberalization and
particularly their competitiveness relative to the rest of the economy are important factors to
correctly foresee the e¤ects of globalization. In turn, the result that welfare may fall with trade
liberalization is an application of second-best theory. As pointed out by Bhagwati (1971) and
Johnson (1965), if trade induces a contraction of industries that were already underproducing
compared to the optimum, it exacerbates an existing distortion and may thus lower welfare.
To isolate the point we want to make, we adopt the following simplifying assumptions.
First, we consider a world populated by M > 1 identical countries so as to abstract from
16 Interestingly, this also suggests that price dispersion may be benecial when it originates from technology
and the elasticity of substitution is high enough. See also Jones (2009) on the role of complementarity in
amplifying industry-level distortions.
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specialization e¤ects. Second, to remove any unnecessary heterogeneity, we normalize the
number of rms in each country to one (Ni = 1), and set 'i = 1 for all i. Third, we assume
that in some industries goods can be freely traded, while in others trade costs are prohibitive.
Accordingly, the unit measure of sectors is partitioned into two subsets of traded and nontraded
industries, ordered such that industries with an index i   2 [0; 1] are subject to negligible
trade costs while the others, with an index i >  , face prohibitive trade costs. This simple
description of imperfect trade integration accords well with the evidence that trade volumes
are high in some industries and very low in others. We consider two complementary aspects
of international integration: (1) an increase in the range  of traded industries and (2) an
increase in the numberM of trading partners. Finally, we assume the markup to be a negative
function of the number of competing rms in a given industry. This immediately delivers the
procompetitive e¤ect of trade, as the number of rms is one in nontraded industries andM > 1
in the others.17
For convenience, we denote the relative markup in nontraded industries as x   (1) = (M).
Under our assumptions, x is greater than one and increasing inM . After some straightforward
substitutions into equation (9), we obtain:
W =
h
1   +  (xM)=(1 )
i1=
1   +  (xM)1=(1 )
: (16)
This expression shows that welfare is a function of the measure of traded industries,  , the
number of trading countries, M , and the markup asymmetry x between open and closed
industries.
INSERT FIGURE 6 HERE
Figure 6 plots welfare as a function of  for the case  = 0 (solid line) and the case
 > 0 (broken line). In the rst case (corresponding for example to Cournot competition),
the economy attains the same level of welfare in autarky ( = 0) and when trade is free in all
industries ( = 1). For any intermediate case, an equilibrium with trade is Pareto inferior to
autarky. The intuition for this result should be by now clear. When  = 0, there is no gain
from consuming foreign varieties and the only e¤ect of trade is to lower markups in industries
17The procompetitive e¤ect of trade, whereby exposure to international competition reduces markups features
prominently in Krugman (1979) and Melitz and Ottaviano (2008), among others. See Chen, Imbs and Scott
(2009) for recent evidence.
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exposed to foreign competition. In both extreme cases,  = 0 and  = 1, markups are uniform
across industries and there is no distortion. As  moves from zero to one, trade breaks this
symmetry: it increases markup dispersion as long as open industries are a minority and lowers
it afterwards. Moreover, when  = 0 and  2 (0; 1) it is easy to see that welfare declines with
an increase in the number of trading countries, M . The reason, again, is that a larger number
of international competitors increases the markup asymmetry between traded and nontraded
industries.
When  > 0, consumers derive a higher utility from the possibility to buy foreign varieties.
In our model, we can think of this variety e¤ect as capturing any source of gains from trade that
is independent of the procompetitive e¤ect. As the gure shows, in this case an equilibrium
with some trade might still be Pareto inferior to autarky when  is low, for the gains from small
volumes of trade might be too low to dominate the price distortion (this happening for low
enough ). However, when  is large enough, the gains from variety will eventually dominate
the (falling) cost of misallocations. With gains from trade of any sort, the equilibrium with
full integration ( = 1) must necessarily dominate autarky.
Even when a high  > 0 assures positive gains from trade, when liberalization increases
markup dispersion, it generates or exacerbate the intersectoral misallocation discussed above.
What can then be done to counteract this negative e¤ect of market integration? We have seen
that the rst-best solution is attained with a uniform markup. Thus, if trade lowers markups
in some sectors, competition policy might be used to match the change in market power in
nontraded sectors too. If competition policy cannot be used, the rst best solution can still be
achieved by giving an appropriate subsidy to industries producing nontraded goods.
Note also that the likelihood that trade be harmful increases with x and that positive gains
from trade will surely materialize if an economy is perfectly competitive (x = 1). In other
words, the potential for welfare losses is higher when domestic markets are not competitive
enough and trade brings large asymmetries between industries selling in world markets and
the rest of the economy. These considerations may be particularly relevant for less developed
countries, suggesting that in some cases promoting competition may be a prerequisite to make
sure to reap positive gains from trade.
In sum:
Proposition 3 With an exogenous number of rms, procompetitive welfare losses from trade
are possible when trade increases markup dispersion.
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4.5 A Simple Quantitative Exercise
The example discussed in the previous section was admittedly provocative. We now show,
however, that a simple quantitative exercise suggests the welfare cost of markup heterogeneity
to be potentially large when entry is restricted. To this end, we use our model, together with
the evidence and the data discussed in Section 2, to compute the cost of markup dispersion
across US manufacturing industries, relative to a rst-best allocation in which markups are
instead uniform. Using equation (9), and denoting by WFB welfare in the rst-best allocation,
we obtain:
W
WFB
=
hR 1
0
 
 1i i
 
1  di
i1=
R 1
0
 
 1i 

i
 1
1  di 
R 1
0 

1 
i di
 1 

: (17)
Computing (17) requires an empirical measure of the productivity index i = 'iN
vi
i for each
industry i. To build such measure, we proceed as follows. Equations (4) and (5) imply:
i =
iw
Pi
: (18)
From utility maximization, we obtain:
Ci =

Pi
P
 1
 1
W = P
1
 1
i E; (19)
where E is total expenditure, P =
hR 1
0 P

 1
i di
i 1

is the ideal price index associated to (1),
and the latter equality follows from choosing P as the numeraire. Equation (19) allows to
express the unobserved industry price index Pi as a function of the observed expenditure share
on an industrys products, i  PiCi=E:
Pi = 
 1

i : (20)
Finally, using (20) into (18) gives:
i = wi
1 

i : (21)
Note that W=WFB is homogeneous of degree zero with respect to all the i. Hence, without
any loss of generality, we can disregard the factor w, which is constant across sectors, and
calibrate i using data on markups, i, and expenditure shares, i, for the US 4-digit SIC
industries over the period 1959-1994. In particular, to compute i, we use the denition of
19
price-cost margins (PCMs) in Section 2 and set i = (1  PCMi) 1. i, is instead computed
as the value of an industrys shipments plus net imports, divided by the total expenditure on
manufacturing goods, using again the NBER datasets. Calibrated in this way, i accounts for
factors, such as parameters of technology but also preferences, that a¤ect expenditure shares
other than relative markups.
Computing i and W=WFB also requires choosing a value for the elasticity of substitution
in consumption among manufacturing goods,  = 1= (1  ). Although available estimates of
 vary widely across studies, most of them are in the range [2; 10] and a value around  = 5
is most frequently used in quantitative exercises. We therefore set  = 2; 5 and 10 (implying
 = 0:5; 0:8 and 0:9) as benchmark cases. We then perform two distinct exercises.
First, we assume the i to be constant overtime and compute their cross-section from (21)
by taking, for each 4-digit industry, the mean value of i and i overtime. Then, we compute
W=WFB over the period 1959-94 using (17). This exercise allows us to isolate the welfare loss
induced by the change in the distribution of markups, holding constant preferences and other
technological factors. The results are reported in the left panel of Table 2. For an intermediate
value of the elasticity of substitution ( = 5), utility falls by 3.6 percent in the period of
analysis. For  = 2, the welfare cost of the observed rise in markup dispersion is lower (1.3
percent), whereas it is much larger (8.1 percent) for  = 10.
Second, we allow the i to be time-varying and compute them year by year. We use these
time-varying coe¢ cients again into (17) to obtain the value of W=WFB. This exercise provides
information on the overall welfare cost of changes in the markup distribution taking into
account that other parameters (such as tastes and technology) have also a¤ected expenditure
shares simultaneously. The results are in the right panel of Table 2, showing that in this case
the welfare cost of markup dispersion is even larger. This indicates that the evolution of the
exogenous parameters contained in the i has contributed to amplify monopoly distortions.
In particular, over the period of analysis, relative utility falls by 2.5 percent for  = 2, by 9.8
percent for  = 5, and by as much as 24.3 percent for  = 10.
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE
In sum, these numerical exercises suggest that, abstracting from any e¤ect that changes
in the average PCMs may have had, the observed increase in markup heterogeneity can entail
substantial welfare costs. How much of these costs can then be attributed to trade integra-
tion? Given that the impact of trade on markup dispersion can be ambiguous, the answer to
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this question is ultimately an empirical one. Although identifying and quantifying how trade
has a¤ected the markup distribution goes beyond the scope of the current paper, the evi-
dence discussed in Section 2 does suggest that trade may be a major determinant of observed
asymmetries in market power.18 We therefore conclude that markup heterogeneity matters
for misallocations and that procompetitive losses from trade may be more than a theoretical
curiosum in this class of models.
5 Free entry
So far, rms are making positive prots and barriers to entry prevent potential competitors
from challenging incumbent rms and sharing the rents. Without those barriers, entry will
take place until pure prots are driven to zero. We now allow for this possibility with the aim
of extending our results to a widely-used class of models where entry is free. This exercise will
lead to remarkably di¤erent conclusions, which qualify some of Lerners original statements.
We start by presenting the market equilibrium and show that, contrary to the previous case,
welfare is a function of the average markup too. Next, we compare it with the social planner
solution and discuss the ine¢ ciencies that arise in the decentralized equilibrium. Finally, we
study the e¤ect of trade between identical countries and argue that, while procompetitive losses
are now unlikely, asymmetric trade liberalization may still exacerbate misallocations, thereby
providing a rationale for policy intervention.
5.1 Market Equilibrium
We now reintroduce the xed cost of production, fi, dened in units of labor, and let the
number of rms vary so as to guarantee that each breaks even. In this way, in equilibrium all
operating prots are used to cover the xed cost:
piyi   yiw
'i
= fiwi:
Substituting pi from (5) and rearranging gives:
yi =
'ifi
i   1
: (22)
18 In particular, if we rerun the regressions in Table 1 computing the standard deviation of markups and other
variables across all the 4-digit SIC industries, we obtain that the increase in trade openness (or its standard
deviation) over the period 1959-94 can explain the entire observed increase in markup dispersion across US
manufacturing industries. The results are available upon request.
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As is well-known, the free-entry condition pins down uniquely rm size.
Given rm size, the number of active rms must be proportional to the amount of labor
employed in each industry. More precisely, the demand for labor in industry i is:
Li = Ni

yi
'i
+ fi

:
Substituting (22) we obtain:
Ni =
i   1
fii
Li: (23)
Finally, to solve for Li, we manipulate the demand equation (2) to yield:
CiPi
CjPj
=

Cj
Ci
 
=
Li
Lj
;
where the latter equality follows from the fact that, with a xed cost in units of labor and
without extra-prots, industry revenue equals the wage bill. Using (3), the market clearing
condition ci = yi, (22) and (23), we obtain:
Li
Lj
=
 
'iN
i
i j
'jN
j
j i
! 
1 
: (24)
Note that (24) di¤ers from the analogous condition in the model without free entry (7). The
key reason is that, in the model with free entry, the entire industry revenue is used up to pay
workers (both for the xed and variable production costs), while in the other case a fraction of
revenue is captured by prots.19 Combining (22), (23) and (24) we obtain an equation linking
the number of rms in any two industries to relative rm size and other exogenous parameters:
N1  ii
N
1  j
j
=

yj
yi
1  'i
'j
j
i
: (25)
This condition will turn out to be useful below.
To understand the role of markups in the model with free entry, consider for the moment
the simpler Cobb-Douglas case corresponding to  = 0. Then, using (22), (23) and (24), we
19A second, less important, di¤erence is that, in the model without entry we set the xed cost to zero. Of
course, the equilibrium allocation of labor would coincide in the two models if we had the same xed cost and
if the exogenous number of rms without entry happened to be equal to the equilibrium number of rms with
entry.
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can write welfare as:
lnW =
Z 1
0
ln

Ni+1i y

i

di =
varietyz }| {Z 1
0
i ln

1   1i
fi

di+
f savingz }| {Z 1
0
ln'i
 1
i di: (26)
This equation shows that the level of markups has now both positive and negative direct e¤ects
on welfare. The rst term in (26) is increasing in i and captures the fact that a high prot
margin stimulates entry, thereby raising the number of rms and welfare so long as variety
has value (i > 0). The second term in (26) is instead decreasing in i and captures the fact
that entry implies that more productive resources are taken by the xed costs. Thus, contrary
to the restricted-entry case, when i > 0 markups now pose a trade-o¤ between diversity and
xed costs at the industry level.
5.2 Social Planner
What are the distortions in the market equilibrium? Is markup asymmetry desirable or does
it impose any welfare costs? To answer these questions, we now compute the allocation that
maximizes the utility of the representative agent. A benevolent social planner chooses Ni and
yi = ci so as to solve:
max
Ni;yi
W =
Z 1
0

Ni+1i yi

di
1=
;
subject to the resource constraint:Z 1
0
Ni

yi
'i
+ fi

di = 1:
The Lagrangian for the above program is:
L =
Z 1
0

Ni+1i yi

di
1=
  
Z 1
0
Ni

yi
'i
+ fi

di  1

;
and the rst order conditions for an optimum are:
@L
@Ni
= 0!W 1  (i + 1) yi N (i+1) 1i = 

yi
'i
+ fi

;
@L
@yi
= 0!W 1 N (i+1)i y 1i =
Ni
'i
:
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Substituting the second rst order condition into the rst yields:
yi =
'ifi
i
: (27)
Taking the ratio of the second rst order condition in industries i and j delivers:
N1  ii
N
1  j
j
=

yj
yi
1  'i
'j
: (28)
Comparing the optimal rm scale (27) to the market outcome (22), we see that the two coincide
when:
i   1 = i; (29)
that is, when the markup is equal to the preference for variety, as in the Dixit-Stiglitz case.
However, comparing (28) with (25), we also see that the optimal allocation of resources across
industries requires i = j , that is, a uniform markup. When the preference for variety is
unequal across industries (the most realistic case) these two requirements are incompatible
and we thus have the following impossibility result:20
Proposition 4 When entry is free and the preference for variety is heterogeneous across in-
dustries (i 6= j for at least two i; j 2 [0; 1]), there exists no markup distribution such that the
market equilibrium replicates the rst-best allocation.
These results show that, in general, a uniform markup across industries and rms is still
a necessary condition for e¢ ciency but, contrary to Lerners original claim, it is not su¢ cient
anymore. The reason is that prots now have a dual role: they a¤ect the allocation of resources
across industries and the equilibrium number of rms per industry. As we know from the
previous section, avoiding intersectoral misallocations requires i = j . However, markups
should also correctly signal the social value of entry and this requires higher prot margins in
industries where variety is more valuable.
Finally, recall that the intersectoral misallocation tends to disappear as preferences ap-
proach the Leontief case. This is true in general and the model with free entry makes no
exception. In fact, taking the limit of (28) and (25) for  !  1 reveals that the two equa-
20Epifani and Gancia (2008) review some evidence suggesting that external economies due to love for variety
di¤er across industries.
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tions converge to the same condition:
yj
yi
=
N1+ii
N
1+j
j
;
which is of course equivalent to Ci = Cj . In this case, the market equilibrium converges to the
rst-best allocation when i   1 = i.
5.3 Optimal Competition Policy, Markup Heterogeneity and Welfare
We now ask what is the markup distribution that maximizes the utility of the representative
agent. In other words, we are interested in nding the constrained e¢ cient allocation that a
planner can achieve by controlling markups and without using lump-sum transfers. To nd it,
we use (22) and (23) to rewrite the welfare function as:
W =
(Z 1
0
"
Li
i
i+1i   1
fi
i
'i
#
di
)1=
=
Z 1
0
h
(Li)
i+1i
i
di
1=
; (30)
where now i 

1
i
i+1 i 1
fi
i
'i. Note that W is increasing in i. Thus, maximizing
(30) is equivalent to maximizing i industry by industry. Then, the rst order condition is:
@i
@i
= 0! i
i   1
=
i + 1
i
! i   1 = i; (31)
which is identical to (29).21 Thus, it is optimal to let the markup reect the social value of
entry, irrespective of the intersectoral ine¢ ciency. This means that, so long as i 6= j , an
increase in markup dispersion may be welfare improving if the resulting markup distribution
gets closer to the one implied by condition (29). It also implies that computing the welfare cost
of a given markup distribution becomes much harder, as it now requires data on i.
Finally, it is instructive to consider the welfare costs of markup heterogeneity in the special
case of i = 0, that is, when entry has no social value per se. This case is of particular interest
because it serves as a metaphor for all models where prots are dissipated in equilibrium
through rent-seeking activities that are socially wasteful. When i = 0, it is of course optimal
to have i = 1; yet, this may not be feasible. What is less obvious, instead, is the cost of
21 It follows immediately that there is no room for welfare-improving intervention on markups in the Dixit-
Stiglitz case. Yet, this is admittedly not the most interesting case to study procompetitive e¤ects.
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markup dispersion. From (24) and
R 1
0 Lidi = 1, we obtain:
Li =
 
'i
 1
i
 
1 R 1
0

'j
 1
j
 
1 
dj
:
Substituting this into the welfare function (30) yields:
W =
Z 1
0
 
'i
 1
i
 
1  di
 1 

;
which takes the same form as (13). Remarkably, this means that markup heterogeneity is
welfare improving when  > 0:5, precisely as we found for productivity heterogeneity. This
result can be understood by noting that, in an equilibrium with free entry, the markup is
nothing but the per unit equivalent of the xed cost fi. Thus, when entry is free but has no
social value, the markup acts a pure cost for the economy and it a¤ects welfare just as the
marginal cost (1=') in the model of Section 4 did.
We summarize the main ndings in the following proposition:
Proposition 5 With free entry, markup symmetry is a necessary, but not a su¢ cient con-
dition for e¢ ciency. Markup heterogeneity always leads to an intersectoral misallocation, but
does not necessarily lower welfare: it may be welfare improving when the preference for variety
is heterogeneous across industries, or when variety has no value (i = 0; i 2 [0; 1]) and the
elasticity of substitution is high ( > 0:5).
5.4 The Procompetitive Effect of Trade, Welfare and Misallocations
Are procompetitive losses from trade possible when entry is free? Does asymmetric trade
liberalization introduce distortions that may be corrected by policy makers? To briey address
these questions we now open the model to trade, as in section 4.4. For simplicity, we focus on
the Cobb-Douglas case, i.e.,  = 0. We consider a world of M symmetric countries and we
denote by Ni the number of rms per country in industry i. Consumption of a given traded
variety in a given country becomes ci = yi=Mi, so that the industry consumption basket can
be written as:
Ci = (Ni)
i+1 (Mi)
i yi:
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Substituting this into (1) and using (22) and (23), we obtain our welfare measure:
lnW =
Z 1
0
lnCidi =
Z 1
0
ln

(Ni Mi)i 'i 1i

di: (32)
As before, we model imperfect market integration by allowing some industries to be closed to
trade. In other words, we set Mi = 1 in the subset of nontraded industries.
When the markup function is such that i = f (Ni Mi) with f 0 () < 0, as in Krugman
(1979), then the procompetitive e¤ect of trade is always welfare improving. To see this, note
that if trade has to lower the markup in an industry, it should also increase the equilibrium
number of rms. Both the fall in i and the rise in Ni Mi increase W . Interestingly, this is
true even when variety has no value, i = 0! Procompetitive losses from trade are still possible,
but only when the fall in markups due to foreign competition is so strong as to reduce the
equilibrium number of rms in an industry below the optimal level.22 While this is impossible
when i = f (Ni Mi) with f 0 () < 0, this outcome is conceivable if trade liberalization a¤ects
the markup not through the number of rms.
In conclusion, when there is free entry, procompetitive losses from trade seem much more
unlikely. Thus, an important benet of entry is that it prevents some of the possibly large
costs identied in Section 4. Yet, asymmetric trade liberalization that increases markup het-
erogeneity exacerbates the intersectoral misallocation of resources and opens the way to Pareto
improving intervention. In particular, there might be excessive product diversity or rm output
in traded industries that can be corrected with an appropriate subsidy to nontraded industries.
We therefore conclude with the following proposition:
Proposition 6 When entry is free and markups are a negative function of the number of
rms in an industry (i = f (Ni Mi), f 0 () < 0; i 2 [0; 1]), the procompetitive e¤ect of trade
is welfare improving, even when trade amplies misallocations due to markup dispersion and
variety has no value.
6 Conclusions
Competition is imperfect in most sectors of economic activity. By exposing rms to foreign
competition, trade is widely believed to help alleviate the distortions stemming from mo-
nopolistic pricing. While this argument is often well-grounded, it neglects that in general
22Eckel (2008) provides conditions for this outcome. In other models, such as Melitz (2003) and Corsetti,
Martin and Pesenti (2007), trade liberalization increases welfare even when the number of varieties falls.
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equilibrium pricing distortions depend on both absolute and relative market power, and that
a trade-induced fall in markups brings about misallocations when it raises their variance. The
latter event is more than a theoretical curiosity, for market globalization a¤ects predominantly
industries that are already relatively more competitive. At the same time, misallocations across
rms and industries have recently been identied as a strikingly important factor behind cross-
country di¤erences in economic performance. Studying how such misallocations may be rooted
in the economy-wide markup distribution and how this may interact with trade liberalization
is therefore crucial for the design of optimal trade and competition policies and for a better
understanding of the welfare e¤ects of trade opening in the presence of market power. This
was the aim of our paper.
We now summarize what we view as the main results. When rm entry is restricted, we nd
that markup heterogeneity entails signicant costs and that asymmetric trade liberalization
may reduce welfare. With free entry of rms, instead, markup heterogeneity is not necessarily
welfare reducing, although it generates an intersectoral misallocation that policy makers can
correct. In this case, we also nd that a trade-induced increase in competition is typically
welfare increasing. Yet, if trade integration raises markup dispersion, the allocation of resources
can be improved upon by subsidizing production in industries that remain relatively more
protected. In this sense, trade liberalization and domestic industrial policy complement each
other. More in general, our analysis has emphasized the neglected principle that, in order to
correctly foresee the e¤ects of trade and competition policy, the evolution of the economy-wide
markup distribution has to be taken into account, and that whether entry is restricted or not
makes an important di¤erence.
By focusing on special cases, the existing literature on the topic o¤ers a partial view
only. One goal of this paper was precisely to clarify the misconceptions that may arise when
restricting the analysis to special cases. A major benet of our general framework is that
it illustrates the exact role of alternative assumptions in shaping the relationship between
competition, misallocations and welfare. We hope that such a unied framework may prove
useful in studying other issues, such as the e¤ects of competition on growth, and in guiding
future empirical and quantitative work. In particular, while we have emphasized markup
heterogeneity across industries, we think that extending the analysis to heterogeneity across
rms may be at least as much important. Yet, accounting for it poses a new di¢ culty, in that
it requires disentangling rm-level estimates of productivity from markups. We view this as a
key challenge for future research.
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Figure 6. Trade and Welfare: solid line ν=0, broken line ν>0 
 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
St.Dev. Openness 0.016*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.012** 0.011***
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.003] [0.005] [0.003]
St.Dev. TFP 0.041*** 0.063*** 0.072*** 0.072*** 0.072***
[0.008] [0.009] [0.010] [0.009] [0.010]
St.Dev. H/L 0.008 0.031*** 0.032*** 0.032*** 0.035***
[0.007] [0.008] [0.010] [0.010] [0.010]
St.Dev. K/Y 0.001*** -0.000* -0.000** -0.000** -0.000***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Average Openness 0.000 -0.002
[0.011] [0.011]
Average TFP -0.033*** -0.033*** -0.005
[0.010] [0.010] [0.011]
Average H/L -0.000 -0.000 -0.006
[0.013] [0.013] [0.013]
Average K/Y 0.000** 0.000** 0.000
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Average PCM -0.136***
[0.024]
Time Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
Industry-Specific Trends YES YES YES YES
Observations 3456 3456 3456 3456 3456 3456 3456
# 3-digit SIC industries 96 96 96 96 96 96 96
R-squared (within) 0.03 0.11 0.14 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.41
Notes: Fixed-Effects (within) estimates with robust standard errors in parentheses. ***,**,* = significant at the 1, 5 and 10-percent
levels, respectively. The mean and standard deviat ion of all variables is computed within 3-digit SIC industries. In column 6,
estimation is by Instrumental Variables, with the second moment of openness instrumented with its first moment. Data sources:
NBER Productivity Database (by Bartelsman and Gray) and NBER Trade Database (by Feenstra).
Table 1. Fixed-Effects Regressions for the Standard Deviation of PCMs
Dependent Variable: Standard Deviation of PCMs within 3-digit SIC Industries
 
 
 
 
W /W FB 
(1959)
W /W FB 
(1994)
∆W /W FB 
(94-59)
W /W FB 
(1959)
W /W FB 
(1994)
∆W /W FB 
(94-59)
σ = 2 
 (α = 0.5) 0.983 0.97 -1.3% 0.986 0.961 -2.5%
σ = 5 (α = 0.8) 0.947 0.913 -3.6% 0.957 0.863 -9.8%
σ
 = 10 (α = 0.9) 0.854 0.785 -8.1% 0.88 0.666 -24.3%
Table 2. Welfare Cost of Markup Dispersion
Constant Φi Time-varying Φi
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
